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To: Epstein, Jeff
Subject: Steve Cohen vs. the Federal Wrecking Ball

The Federal Wrecking Ball
By Edward Jay Epstein

A bedrock principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is that there is a =resumption of innocence, This should mean that if the government fails =o find incriminating evidence in an exhaustive investigation, they =annot punish a person for a crime or confiscate his property. Yet, =rosecutors have found ways to bypass the absence of evidence when it =omes to Wall Street, Consider the case of Steven A. Cohen, the founder =nd owner of SAC Capital Advisors, a ten-billion group of hedge funds, =o one can doubt that the six year investigation of him for inside =rading qualifies as exhaustive.

It originated with a highly-plausible theory that his =onsistently high trading profits resulted from an orchestrated scheme =f inside trading. To substantiate it, the SEC and Department of =ustice sought the requisite evidence. They subpoenaed or otherwise =anaged to obtain 375 million pages of the trading records, =orrespondence and other documents of Cohen and his SAC funds. This =assive trove of documents, however, did not yield any usable evidence =hat Cohen was involved in inside trading. The Feds also employed =urreptitious means to attempt to find evidence to substantiate their =heory, including planting court-approved listening devices in =ohen's home to intercept his conversations, including ones with his =op lieutenants used plan his funds' weekly trading strategy, and =lanting a mole in his organization. The mole was Richard C.B Lee, a =ormer SAC employee, who, wearing a wire, proposed various "trading =deas" based on inside information to Cohen (presumably scripted by =is Fed handlers.). Despite the provocations, none of the bugging =roduced any usable evidence against Cohen. Finally, as is not uncommon =n Wall Street cases, prosecutors attempted to induce former and =resent SAC employees to testify against Cohen, including eight who had =een themselves charged with using inside information, Even though =ive of them agreed to cooperate with the government, none were able to =rovide evidence that Cohen had known of their alleged inside trading, =ven wen by proffering it they might have spared them prison sentence. =As a result, the government had no evidence to support its theory in =ourt. Despite this embarrassing absence of evidence against Cohen, the =rosecutors did not give up. Instead, it shifted to plan B: targeting =ohen's corporation, SAC Capital in a two pronged attack.

The first prong was a Grand Jury indictment of Cohen's corporate =lto ego, SAC Capital, for security and wire fraud. It alleged that =AC had encouraged its employees to seek illegally-obtained data by =roviding them with profit-sharing and then not properly enforcing its =wn rules against using inside information. SAC Capital, which denies =his allegation, will have its day in court to defend itself.

The second prong was a civil forfeiture complaint charging that =AC Capital engaged in a money-laundering conspiracy. Such civil =orfeiture complaints began as means of destroying the cash resources =f drug traffickers. It allows the government to seize all the assets =f a suspect without even proving that a crime has been committed. =ince it is technically leveled against the asset itself, the =overnment need only to assert is that the "preponderance of the =vidence" shows that it is subject to forfeiture. When this complaint =s tied to money-laundering it can be disastrous for a financial =nstitution because the government can freeze or seize all its assets, =ncluding those funds loaned to it.. In the case of SAC Capital, the =utative money-laundering stems from the allegation the illegal earning =ere investing in, and thereby intermingled with, SAC Funds. But even =f this occurred, was it the sort of money-laundering in which profits =rom an illegal enterprise are disguised as profits from a legal one? =one of the traders had to disguise their commissions, bonuses and =erformance compensation, nor did they represent them as anything other =han trading profits. But the government does not actually prove there =as money laundering since this a civil forfeiture complaint.

The lethal part of the civil forfeiture complaint was its scope, =eeking not a specific amount but "any and all" assets of SAC =apital. At last count, according to its regulatory filings, SAC funds =eld some \$51 billion in securities and loans from counter parties. To =e sure, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara currently is not seeking to =reeze these assets, a freeze

which could rip a Lehman-size hole in the counter parties, and he has agreed to a Court Protective order tying up about \$5 billion of SAC's capital. But the government could change its mind at any time, since a footnote in the agreement states that the protective order does not limit the ability of United States to proceed with the seizure of all of SAC's assets at some future point. So a sword of Damocles hangs over SAC Capital.

Even if it demolishes his corporate alter ego, Cohen may well survive the Federal wrecking ball. He is after all a billionaire many times over with an extensive art collection. My concern here is not the fate of Cohen or SAC Capital. It is with the government's expansive use of money-laundering charges in civil forfeiture cases when it is unable to find incriminating evidence.

as ever

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