
From: Vincenzo Iozzo <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Saturday, August 23, 2014 11:07 AM
To: jeffrey E.
Cc: Joi Ito
Subject: Re: de-anonymize tor/bitcoin

hmm yeah, I like it - it's crazy :-) so, why not?

The problem we have is that we need to create an actual physical network =here people on food stamps have some kind of 'debit card' and merchants =ave a special POS to process those transactions (probably something =ike a Square reader will be sufficient). Not sure how big of a deal =hat is in terms of capital, but it's probably the only option unless we =ant to assume people on food stamps have smartphones..

But the good news is that if we do that and we succeed we obtain the =ollowing:

- 1) A good enough code base to then to the SWIFT thing + a lot more
- 2) A govt stamp of approval in crypto-currency stuff
- 3) Once merchants have our POS we can extend the currency to literally =everyone*

Jeffrey, does the govt on our side comes with money attached?

Joi, what do you think?

On 23/ago/2014, at 11:34, jeffrey E. <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote:

> =<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/08/22/food-stamp-fraud-rampant-gao-re=ort/> make food stamps a test bed for transparant cyrpto? govt on =ur side

>

>

> On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 5:54 AM, Vincenzo Iozzo <[REDACTED]> =rote:

> Jeffrey,

>

> this stuff is a bit heavy but if you care for it here are a couple of =inks:

>

> 1) One obvious technique to de-anonymize tor is to control the 'exit =odes', meaning the nodes that connect Tor to the Internet. If you =ontrol enough of them you can de-anonymize a lot of it.

>

> 2) A friend of mine (among other people), found ways to de-anonymize a

> =ot of the 'hidden services' (roughly the 'secret' websites inside

> tor) =uch more efficiently. I believe Tor fixed those flaws by now,

> but it's = pretty ingenious attack:

> =<http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf> The bottom

> =ine there is that with roughly \$11k you can realistically

> de-anonymize =ny hidden service on tor. You do that by 'pretending' to

> be one of the =ervers handing out the addresses of the hidden services

>

> 3) The third option is to just attack the machine(s) of the 'bad

> =uys', this is for instance what the FBI did a while ago against a

> =etwork oh pedophiles:

> =http://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/1jmrta/founder_of_the_freedom_

> host=ng_arrested_held/ This option is targeted but it always works.
> The trick there was to attack the computer and then have the computer
> connect to a non-tor website, by doing that they could get the IP
> address and de-anonymize the user. Of course once you have control
> over the machine you can do much more than that, but they stuck to
> that
>
> As for bitcoin itself, I believe I sent you the Bitlodge paper.
> Another very good one is this:
> <http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/files/imc13.pdf>
>
> Now some of these approaches are probabilistic, (3) is not. But I
> guess my point is: if you *really* want to figure out what somebody is
> doing on tor/bitcoin you can do it given enough resources. Not that it
> matters too much, but well
>
>
>
> --
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```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <key>conversation-id</key>
    <integer>299373</integer>
    <key>date-last-viewed</key>
    <integer>0</integer>
    <key>date-received</key>
    <integer>1408792037</integer>
    <key>flags</key>
    <integer>8590195713</integer>
    <key>gmail-label-ids</key>
    <array>
        <integer>6</integer>
        <integer>2</integer>
    </array>
    <key>remote-id</key>
    <string>433850</string>
</dict>
</plist>
```