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**From:** Vincenzo Iozzo <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Saturday, August 23, 2014 11:25 AM  
**To:** jeffrey E.  
**Cc:** Joi Ito  
**Subject:** Re: de-anonymize tor/bitcoin

actually scratch that, magstrips on cards have enough space to fit in whatever token/identifier we want for the crypto currency. It's just a matter of convincing the companies that deploy them to adapt to our standards, but we still need to hand out debit cards to people

On 23/ago/2014, at 12:07, Vincenzo Iozzo <[REDACTED]> wrote:

> hmm yeah, I like it - it's crazy :-)) so, why not?  
> The problem we have is that we need to create an actual physical network where people on food stamps have some kind of 'debit card' and merchants have a special POS to process those transactions (probably something like a Square reader will be sufficient). Not sure how big of a deal that is in terms of capital, but it's probably the only option unless we want to assume people on food stamps have smartphones..

>  
> But the good news is that if we do that and we succeed we obtain the following:

- > 1) A good enough code base to then to the SWIFT thing + a lot more
- > 2) A govt stamp of approval in crypto-currency stuff
- > 3) Once merchants have our POS we can extend the currency to literally

> everyone\*

>  
> Jeffrey, does the govt on our side comes with money attached?

>  
> Joi, what do you think?

>  
> On 23/ago/2014, at 11:34, jeffrey E. <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote:

>  
>> <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/08/22/food-stamp-fraud-rampant-gao-report/> make food stamps a test bed for transparent crypto? govt on our side

>>

>>

>> On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 5:54 AM, Vincenzo Iozzo <[REDACTED]> wrote:

>> Jeffrey,

>>

>> this stuff is a bit heavy but if you care for it here are a couple of links:

>>

>> 1) One obvious technique to de-anonymize tor is to control the 'exit nodes', meaning the nodes that connect Tor to the Internet. If you control enough of them you can de-anonymize a lot of it.

>>

>> 2) A friend of mine (among other people), found ways to de-anonymize

>> a lot of the 'hidden services' (roughly the 'secret' websites inside

>> tor) much more efficiently. I believe Tor fixed those flaws by now,

>> but it's a pretty ingenious attack:

>> <http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf> The bottom

>> line there is that with roughly \$11k you can realistically

>> de-anonymize =ny hidden service on tor. You do that by 'pretending'  
>> to be one of the =ervers handing out the addresses of the hidden  
>> services  
>>  
>> 3) The third option is to just attack the machine(s) of the 'bad  
>> =uys', this is for instance what the FBI did a while ago against a  
>> =etwork oh pedophiles:  
>> =ttp://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/1jmrta/founder\_of\_the\_freedom  
>> \_host=ng\_arrested\_held/ This option is targeted but it always works.  
>> The trick there was to =ttack the computer and then have the computer  
>> connect to a non-tor =ebsite, by doing that they could get the IP  
>> address and de-anonymize =he user. Of course once you have control  
>> over the machine you can do =uch more than that, but they stuck to  
>> that  
>>  
>> As for bitcoin itself, I believe I sent you the Bitlodine paper.  
>> =nother very good one is this:  
>> =ttp://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/files/imc13.pdf  
>>  
>> Now some of these approaches are probabilistic, (3) is not. But I  
>> =uess my point is: if you \*really\* want to figure out what somebody  
>> is =oing on tor/bitcoin you can do it given enough resources. Not  
>> that it =atters too much, but well  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> --  
>>     please note  
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>

```
<?xml version=.0" encoding=TF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version=.0">
<dict>
  <key>conversation-id</key>
  <integer>299373</integer>
  <key>date-last-viewed</key>
  <integer>0</integer>
  <key>date-received</key>
  <integer>1408793092</integer>
  <key>flags</key>
  <integer>8590195713</integer>
  <key>gmail-label-ids</key>
```

```
<array>
  <integer>6</integer>
  <integer>2</integer>
</array>
<key>remote-id</key>
<string>433851</string>
</dict>
</plist>
```